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1 Introduction 
1.1 Marine insurance warranties in the English law 
The warranty regime in the English marine insurance law for a long time has been in 
the center of attention of courts, academics and practitioners. The reason for that are dis-
tinctive characteristics of insurance warranties, which make them a unique type of term, 
sometimes described as “draconian”.1 Namely, attribution of a warranty status to the as-
sured’s undertaking to act in particular way (to fulfill certain condition, etc.) turns a strict 
compliance with it into a condition precedent to the insurer’s liability; in case of non-
compliance, the issues of fault, materiality of a breach or presence of a causal connection 
between a breach and a loss are disregarded. Furthermore, a specific remedy of “automatic 
discharge from liability” makes the warranty regime especially severe for assureds. In the 
beginning of the XX century, all these traits were reflected in the English Marine Insurance 
Act 1906 (the MIA 1906) and remained unchanged for many years. 
However, it has been widely recognized that warranties constitute a source of poten-
tial injustice, as they entitle insurers to rely on minor and non-causative breaches to avoid 
liability under the policy. Moreover, as the warranty regime is strikingly different from a 
general civil law approach to alteration of risk, its maintenance may hinder a process of 
internationalization of the English insurance law and, from the practical perspective, make 
London market less attractive for new clients. Therefore, English courts and the insurance 
industry endeavored to mitigate harsh effects of warranties. Various measures of ameliora-
tion were adopted, but none of them could be described as a finale solution. The need for 
legislative reform was gradually becoming apparent. 
In 2006, the UK Law Commission, a statutory body created for purpose of reviewing 
and reforming the law, jointly with the Scottish Law Commission started a project “Insur-
ance Contract Law”. The project concluded with an adaptation of the Insurance Act 2015, 
                                                 
 
1 Hussain v Brown [1996] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 627, per Saville LJ, 630 
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which envisages significant changes of the warranty regime. The recent reform has 
raised a number of important issues: 
(1) What particular problems, created by the “classical” warranty regime, were legis-
lators trying to solve? 
(2) What are the differences between the warranty regime under the MIA 1906 and 
the regime established by the Insurance Act 2015? 
(3) Has the reform brought the English warranty regime closer to practices of other 
common law countries and/or to the civil law approach to alteration of risk? 
A purpose of this thesis is to consider these questions in the light of relevant experi-
ence from England and other countries. The answers to them are important for such issues 
of theoretical and practical significance, as: how the recent reform has affected the existing 
warranty regime; has it created any potential problems; will the English marine insurance 
market make a step towards internationalization, and so on. Overall, this thesis aims to 
study a process of development of the marine insurance warranty regime in England, in 
comparison with its international surrounding. 
1.2 Structure of thesis 
The main body of this thesis is separated into three parts: 
 (1) Chapter 2 is devoted to nuances of the warranty regime under the MIA 1906, 
with the main accent on characteristics of warranties (the “strict compliance” doctrine, the 
“automatic discharge” rule, etc.). The place of warranties among other insurance contract 
terms and their inner classification are also discussed; 
(2) Chapter 3 refers to the Norwegian approach to general alterations of the risk and 
to warranty-resembling clauses, as an example of the civil law solution; 
(3) Chapter 4 gives an overview of previous attempts to mitigate the warranty regime 
in England and other common law countries and a detailed analysis of the recent legislative 
reform. 
The final Chapter provides a conclusion on questions of a present development and 
future perspectives of marine insurance warranties in England. 
3 
1.3 Legal sources 
Due to the fact that marine insurance warranties are the common law concept, the 
majority of sources used for preparation of this thesis are of the English origin. They in-
clude: statutes (the MIA 1906, the Insurance Act 2015), preparatory work (papers of the 
Law Commission, draft bills, etc.), standard documents, case law and legal literature. As 
the concept of warranties is common to marine and non-marine insurance in England, ex-
amples from non-marine insurance are used when suitable. References to the legislation, 
case law, reform projects and legal literature from other common law jurisdictions, such as 
Australia, New Zealand, the USA and Canada, are also frequently made. Provisions of the 
Nordic Marine Insurance Plan 2013 and the Commentary to it are used to illustrate the civil 
law solutions; furthermore, some cases heard before Norwegian courts are also referred to. 
1.4 Method 
The main method of the research is a comparative analysis of the “classical” warranty 
regime in England (Chapter 2), its alterations, introduced by the recent reform (Chapter 4) 
and relevant approaches in other common and civil law countries (Chapters 3, 4). As it 
would be impossible to embrace all the variety of problems related to marine insurance 
warranties, some of them are left beyond the scope of this work: for example, a status of 
“navigation” conditions in the MIA 1906.2 Without diminishing a significance of such is-
sues, it should be noted that this thesis is devoted to a more general question of the devel-
opment of the warranty regime in the English marine insurance. 
2 The warranty regime under the MIA 1906 
2.1 Alteration of risk and warranty 
At formation of the insurance contract, the assessment of the risk insured is made on 
the basis of presumptions about particular past or present facts, or future events. They con-
stitute a fundament of the policy; if it fails, the principle of fair balance of interests between 
                                                 
 
2 The MIA 1906, ss 42, 43, 54, 46, 48 and 49. 
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the insurer and the assured may require an amendment, or even a termination of the policy. 
In order to help the insurer to regulate the risk insured, the English law adopted, i.a., a no-
tion of “warranty”. 
However, the civil law jurisdictions deal with the same problem without introducing 
an exhaustive warranty regime. Namely, they provide insurers with an opportunity to con-
trol the risk insured through general provisions on alteration of risk. Trine-Lise Wilhelm-
sen, a Professor at the Scandinavian Institute of Maritime Law, have undertaken a compre-
hensive study of various legal systems and concluded that various definitions of “alteration 
of risk” seem to be based on four main approaches. Those are, as follows: 
(1) The risk must be increased compared to the written or implied conditions of the 
insurance contract (Norway); 
(2) The risk must be altered or increased in such a way that the insurer would not 
have accepted the insurance at all (Belgium) or would not have accepted the insurance on 
the same conditions if he had known about the increase (Italy, Greece); 
(3) The risk is “substantially” altered (Japan, Slovenia, Croatia); 
(4) The last approach is to connect the sanction to circumstances affecting or altering 
the risk after the contract is concluded without any further definition (France).3 
Despite the differences in these methods and in the effects of particular provisions, 
they are all governed by a basic requirement of “subjective materiality”.4 This means that 
in relation to the circumstances, which were in some way relevant to the insurer when the 
contract was entered into, a general duty of the assured not to alter the risk could be traced; 
otherwise, the insurer is not entitled to react against the alteration. 
The English law is also acquainted with a concept of change of risk; however, it dif-
fers in its implications from the continental one. Two types of changes of risk are recog-
nized: (1) alteration of risk; (2) and increase of risk. 
Alteration of risk takes place when the subject matter insured is substantially 
changed, i.e., the insured risk is substituted by a new one. In this case, a general principle 
                                                 
 
3 Trine-Lise Wilhelmsen, “Issues of Marine Insurance” (Oslo: MarIus, 2001), 113-115 
4 Ibid, 115 
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of the common law is that the insurer is automatically discharged from liability: “There 
would be no cover where the circumstances had so changed that it could properly be said 
by the insurers that the new situation was something which, on the true construction of the 
policy, they had not agreed to cover”.5 Other cases, where the risk remains the same in es-
sence, but a loss is more likely to occur – for example, if the ship insured under the war 
policy sails into areas of enhanced military activity, – are referred to as increase of risk. 
The civil law concept of alteration of risk embraces both types of situations; hence, 
the assured’s duty not to alter risk applies to them equally. The striking feature of the Eng-
lish law is that there is no general duty of the assured to prevent the increase of risk during 
the currency of the policy. Such increase is deemed to be in contemplation of insurers, 
“since the insurance bargain is one where, in return for the premium, they take upon them-
selves the risk that an insured peril will operate”.6 Therefore, insurers cannot claim that the 
increased risk goes beyond what they have agreed to cover. As Pollock CB observed in 
Baxendale v Harvey7: 
“An insured may light as many candles as he please in his house, though each addi-
tional candle increases the danger of setting the house on fire”. 
In absence of an implied duty of the assured not to increase risk, the English marine 
insurance law was in need of another way to secure the insurer’s position. Hence, the war-
ranty regime was implemented. Parallel to provisions on alteration of risk in the civil law, 
warranties serve as an instrument of administration of the risk insured: they circumscribe it, 
oblige the assured to take suitable precautions, etc.8 However, despite the similarity of 
goals, a closer look on the warranty regime reveals its substantial differences from the civil 
law approach. 
                                                 
 
5 Kausar v Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd [2000] Lloyds Rep IR 154 
6 Ibid. See also Swiss Reinsurance Company and others v United India Insurance Company Limited 
[2005] EWHC 237 (Comm). 
7 Baxendale v Harvey (1859) 4 H & N 445, 449 
8 On the purpose of warranties, see the Law Commission Consultation paper No182 (2007) ss 2.1-
2.2 
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2.2 Historical perspective 
The English and the civil marine insurance law have common roots: continental prac-
tices were brought to England in the XIV century, with establishment of the Hanseatic 
League of Lombard trading houses in London.9 However, the unity broke in the XVII cen-
tury, when English courts began to acknowledge that some of the assured’s contractual 
undertakings could constitute a condition precedent (i.e., a prerequisite) to the insurer’s 
promise of cover.10 A breach of these terms, referred to as “warranties”, gave the insurer 
unconditional right to repudiate the policy. By contrast, in civil law jurisdictions a breach 
of resembling term entitled the insurer to repudiate only if that breach went to the root of 
the contract and was causative of the loss.11 
The appointment of Lord Mansfield as Lord Chief Justice in 1756 led to further 
breakthrough in the English marine insurance law, i.a., in relation to the warranty regime. 
First, Lord Mansfield made a clear distinction between a warranty, “which makes part of a 
written police”12, and a mere representation. Next, a revolving conclusion followed: “There 
is a material distinction between a warranty and a representation. A representation may be 
equitably and substantially answered: but a warranty must be strictly complied with[…]”.13 
In quoted case, De Hahn v Hartley, the ship warranted to sail with “50 hands or up-
wards”, sailed with 46 hands, but only in a few hours further six men were taken onboard. 
However, Lord Mansfield’s understanding of the “strict compliance” doctrine implied that 
any immaterial, non-causative, and even rectified breach of warranty entitled the insurer to 
refuse to pay. Thus, the departure of the English marine insurance law from its continental 
roots finalized. Since the late XVIII century, a process of codification of the rules, laid 
down by Lord Mansfield and subsequent case law, began. 
                                                 
 
9 Baris Soyer, “Warranties in Marine Insurance”, 2nd edition (London: Cavendish Publishing 
Limited, 2006), 5 
10 Jefferies v Legandra (1692) 4 Mod. 58; Lethulier’s case (1692), 91 Eng Rep 384; Gordon v Mor-
ley 93 Eng Rep 1171 
11 John Hare, “The omnipotent warranty: England v the world”, compendium “Marine insurance 
at the turn of millennium”, vol.2 (Antwerpen, Groningen, Oxford: Intersentia, 2000), 43 
12 Pawson v Watson (1778) 2 Cowp 785, 787-788 
13 De Hahn v Hartley (1786) 1 T.R. 343, 345 
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As the result, the Marine Insurance Act was adopted in 1906, with Sections 33 - 41 
devoted to different aspects of the warranty regime. Analogous statutes were implemented 
throughout the common law world, such as: the Australian MIA 1909, the New Zealand 
MIA 1908 and the Canadian Federal MIA 1993. Although that resulted in a certain unity of 
the warranty regime, the majority of common law countries have eventually amended it by 
various legislative and non-legislative measures.14 To understand the aims and the content 
of these alterations, the “classical” warranty regime under the MIA 1906 should be ad-
dressed first. 
2.3 Definition of warranty 
2.3.1 Statutory definition 
Section 33(1) of the MIA 1906 provides that: 
“Warranty[…] means a promissory warranty, that is to say, a warranty by which the 
assured undertakes that some particular thing shall or shall not be done, or that some condi-
tion shall be fulfilled, or whereby he affirms or negatives the existence of a particular state 
of facts”. 
According to this definition, warranty status can be attributed to a huge variety of un-
dertakings: (1) as to past or present facts (affirmative warranties); (2) as to future conduct 
of the assured (continuing/promissory warranties); or (3) that some condition shall be ful-
filled, although the inclusion of this middle category was argued to be rather open-ended 
and creating a basis for litigation.15 Indeed, the courts occasionally have problems with 
deciding whether a particular statement is or is not a warranty. 
An affirmation of fact, for instance, can constitute either a warranty or a representa-
tion, an instrument with its own legal regime.16 In the XVIII century, Lord Mansfield en-
deavored to separate these concepts by stating that: warranties make a part of the written 
policy, whereas representations are made outside of the written contract; and representa-
                                                 
 
14 For further discussion, see Chapter 4, ss 4.2.1.3 and 4.3.2. 
15 The Law Commission Consultation paper No 204 (2012), s 12.6. See, for example, Switzerland 
Insurance Australia v Movie Fisheries Pty Ltd (1997) 144 ALR 234 
16 See the MIA 1906 s 20 
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tions may be equally or substantially answered, while warranties must be strictly complied 
with.17 The third criterion of distinction is that the test of materiality is applicable only to 
representations. As Lord Eldon LC put it in Newcastle Fire Insurance v Macmorran & 
Co18: 
“It is a first principle of the law of insurance, on all occasions, that where a represen-
tation is material it must be complied with – if immaterial, that immateriality may be in-
quired into and shown; but that if there is a warranty… the materiality or immateriality 
signifies nothing”.  
Aside from the broadness of the MIA s 33(1), problems in defining warranties are 
numerous. To begin with, the very process of creation of warranties fuels potential uncer-
tainty. 
2.3.2 Creation of warranty 
According to the MIA s 33(2), a warranty may be either express or implied. Warran-
ties may be implied by statute. The MIA specifies four implied warranties: the warranty of 
seaworthiness (s 39(1)), portworthiness (s 39(2)), cargoworthiness (s 40(2)), and legality (s 
41). In theory, warranties may be implied into a contract of insurance by courts, as in any 
other contract, for example, for reasons of business efficacy. However, in practice this pos-
sibility is of little importance to insurance contracts.19 
The majority of warranties are created expressly by parties: i.e., they are either writ-
ten into the policy, or incorporated into it by reference. The MIA s 35(1) states that an ex-
press warranty may be in any form of words from which the intention to warrant is to be 
inferred. Consequently, there is no single verbal construction to indicate a warranty. Even 
the use of the word “warranty” is not decisive. Here, Arnould provides the following ex-
ample: “The fact that the word “warranted” is used in a policy does not always prove that 
the term to which it refers amounts to a warranty. Thus, the clause “warranted free from 
                                                 
 
17 Pawson v Watson (1778) 2 Cowp 785; De Hahn v Hartley (1786) 1 T.R. 343 
18 Newcastle Fire Insurance v Macmorran & Co (1815) 3 Dow 255, 262 
19 As noted in Consultation paper No 204 (2012), s 12.13 
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particular average” is not a warranty; it is an exception from the risk undertaken by the 
underwriter”.20 
Courts in England and other common law countries are sometimes prepared to find a 
clause, labeled as a warranty, not to be one, in order to mitigate the harshness of the war-
ranty regime.21 For instance, in Roberts v Anglo-Saxon Insurance Ltd22, a statement “war-
ranted: use only for commercial travelling” was held not to be a “true” warranty, because 
“[…]the parties had used that language as words descriptive of the risk”. Therefore, even if 
a term apparently seems to be a warranty, it can be construed otherwise by courts. 
On the other hand, a warranty may be inferred from any words demonstrating an in-
tention to warrant. The courts have tried not to push this doctrine to extremes23, yet some-
times it is applicable. In HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd v New Hampshire In-
surance Co24, the Court of Appeal held that an undertaking to produce six films in the “pe-
cuniary loss indemnity” policy must be construed as a warranty, because the essence of the 
risk insured was generation of a certain revenue, and the films could generate it only if 
completed. Furthermore, Lord Justice Rix listed several tests for identifying a warranty: 
“[para 101] It is a question of construction, and the presence or absence of the word 
“warranty” or “warranted” is not conclusive. One test is whether it is a term which goes to 
the root of the transaction; a second, whether it is descriptive or bears materially on the risk 
of loss; a third, whether damages would be an unsatisfactory or inadequate remedy”. 
Overall, the approach to creation of warranties is very flexible. For instance, the Law 
Commission in 1980 Report summarized possible ways of creating warranties as follows25: 
(1) By the use of the word “warranty”. It is to be recalled that the word “warranty” is 
indicative, but not decisive; 
                                                 
 
20 Arnould, “On the Law of Marine Insurance and Average”, 11th ed. (London: Law Publishers, 
1924), 829 
21 For further discussion, see Chapter 4, ss 4.2.1.2-4.2.1.3. 
22 Roberts v Anglo-Saxon Insurance Ltd (1927) 27 LI L Rep 313, per Bankes LJ 314 
23 See Clapham v Cologan (1813) 3 Camp. 382, where the court rejected an argument that a mere 
description of the ship by English name constituted a warranty of nationality. 
24 HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd v New Hampshire Insurance Co [2001] 2Lloyd’s Rep 
161 
25 “Insurance Law: Non-Disclosure and Breach of Warranty” (1980) Law Com No104, s 6.3 
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(2) By the use of “basis of the contract” clauses – a legal device, typically a statement 
on a proposal form, that converts the assured’s answers and declarations into contractual 
warranties; 
(3) By an expression of the strict compliance and the right to repudiate for a breach26; 
(4) By the use of phrases such as “condition precedent”, from which the court can in-
fer that the parties intended the strict compliance and the right to repudiate for a breach27; 
(5) By the use of any other words such that the court concludes that, on true construc-
tion of the whole document containing the term, the parties intended the term to possess the 
attributes of a warranty. 
Overall, in order to determine if the term is a “true” warranty, one must consider in-
tentions of the parties revealed by the contract as a whole. Warranties are “an elusive tar-
get”, by expression of the Law Commission28; the difficulties in defining them lead to a 
significant uncertainty in insurance relationships and provide ground for a vast litigation. 
The problem is enhanced by the fact that the same term may be drawn in different ways – 
as a definition of risk, an exclusion from liability, or a warranty. Each of options may lead 
to different consequences for insurers and assureds. For that reason, it is important to draw 
a line between warranties and other provisions of the insurance contract. 
2.3.3 Warranty in hierarchy of contractual terms 
Lord Greene MR described the term “warranty” as “one of the most ill-used expres-
sions in the legal dictionary”.29 Indeed, it has a number of meanings: for instance, a warran-
ty in the insurance law is a very different thing from a warranty in the general contract law. 
In latter, the word “warranty” usually describes a term of minor importance, as opposed to 
                                                 
 
26 After Bank of Nova Scotia v Hellenic Mutual War Risks Association (Bermuda) Ltd (The Good 
Luck) [1991] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 191; [1992] 1 A.C 233, it is more correct to speak of an “automatic 
termination” of insurers’ liability. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Consultation paper No204 (2012), s 11.19 
29 Finnegan v Allen (1943) 1 KB 425, 430 
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“condition” – a term that “goes to the root of the contract”.30 If a condition is breached, the 
non-breaching party may repudiate the contract for the future in addition to damages. If a 
warranty is breached, damages are the only remedy available. For example, Sale of Goods 
Act 1979 Section 11(3) states: 
“Whether a stipulation in a contract of sale is a condition, the breach of which gives 
rise to the right to treat the contract as repudiated, or a warranty, the breach of which may 
give rise to a claim for damages but not to a right to reject the goods[...]” 
In contrast, in the insurance law warranties have a “dominant” position. According to 
hierarchy of contractual terms, presented by the Law Commission in 2006 Issues paper31: 
 (1) Warranties carry the most severe consequences for the assured, because their 
breach leads to the insurer’s automatic discharge from liability (i.e., the insurer does not 
need to make a choice to repudiate the policy). This unique feature of warranties was 
acknowledged in The Good Luck case.32 
(2) Conditions precedent to a claim are mostly procedural requirements: for exam-
ple, to notify of a claim. As in case with warranties, the insurer may refuse to pay a particu-
lar claim even if the breach of such condition is not material or causative to the loss; how-
ever, other claims under the policy will stay unaffected. 
(3) Clauses “descriptive of the risk” and “excluding the liability” indicate under 
which circumstances the insurer shall or shall not cover the loss. These clauses are also 
known as “suspensive” conditions, because in case of breach the insurer’s liability is only 
suspended until the breach is remedied. 
(4) Innominate terms are qualified by the fact that the remedy for their breach de-
pends on its seriousness: it may be either a right to repudiate the contract and damages, or 
only damages.33 Notably, in Alfred McAlpine case34 it was suggested that a breach of such 
                                                 
 
30 For further discussion, see Jill Poole, “Textbook on Contract Law”, 12th ed. (Oxford University 
press, 2014), 301-302 
31 Issues paper 2 “Warranties” (2006), ss 2.12-2.13 
32 The Good Luck [1991] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 191 
33 See Honkong Fir Shipping Co. Ltd v Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd (1962) 2 QB 26. Existence of 
innominate terms in insurance contracts was acknowledged in Phonenix General Insurance Co v 
Greece SA v Halvanon Insurance Co Ltd [1985]2 Lloyd’s Rep.599 
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term might be sufficiently serious to justify a rejection of particular claim, but not the 
whole contract. However, the idea of a “partial repudiatory breach” was criticized by Court 
of Appeal in Friends Provident Life and Pensions v Sirius International Insurance35 as 
creating a completely new doctrine. Thus, the law is inconsistent on this point. 
(5) Mere terms are equal to “warranties” in the general contract law; their breach has 
no bearing on the insurer’s liability, as it is adequately remedied by damages. 
Overall, marine insurance warranties have a unique place among other policy terms, 
as they envisage the harshest consequences of non-compliance for assureds. A detailed 
examination of main characteristics of warranties, which make them one of the most pow-
erful and criticized instruments in the English insurance law, is provided below. 
2.4 Characteristics of warranty 
The following characteristics can be attributed to a marine insurance warranty on the 
basis of the MIA 1906 provisions and relevant case law: 
(1) It must be exactly complied with; 
(2) It need not be material to the risk; 
(3) Causal link between the breach of warranty and the loss is irrelevant; 
(4) Absolute character of warranty: there is no excuse (no defence) for the breach; 
(5) Specific consequences of the breach: “automatic discharge” of the insurer from li-
ability; 
(6) There is no remedy for the breach. 
In complex, these features constitute the traditional warranty regime in the English 
insurance law. Clearly, such severe rules can lead to striking injustice towards the assured. 
For that reason, the recent legislative reform has reviewed some of them to various extent. 
However, to understand modern amendments, the original approach should be analyzed 
first. 
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35 Friends Provident Life and Pensions v Sirius International Insurance [2005] EWCA Civ. 601 
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2.4.1 Strict compliance 
Warranties in insurance contracts have been occasionally characterized as “condi-
tions precedent” to attachment of the risk, or to liability of the insurer. In Thomson v 
Weems36, Lord Blackburn stated: “In policies of marine insurance[…] the compliance with 
that warranty is a condition precedent to the attaching of the risk”. In The Good Luck37, 
Lord Goff affirmed: “[…]fulfillment of the warranty is a condition precedent to the liability 
of the insurer”. The word “condition” here is used in a contingent sense, as “a stipulation of 
a state of affairs that must be achieved before any contractual liability, or possibly any fur-
ther contractual liability, will be incurred”.38 The rationale behind is that warranties are 
indicators of the risk, which the insurer was agreed to indemnify originally. 
Yet what constitutes “compliance” with a warranty? Since the times of Lord Mans-
field, it was not challenged that warranties require strict (literal) compliance: “[…]nothing 
tantamount will do, or answer the purpose; it must be strictly performed, as being part of 
the agreement”.39 In De Hahn v Hartley40, Ashhurst J reaffirmed: “The very meaning of 
warranty is to preclude all questions whether it has been substantially complied with; it 
must be literally so”. 
This approach was reflected in the MIA 1906 s 33(3): 
“A warranty, as above defined, is a condition which must be exactly complied with, 
whether it be material to the risk or not”. 
The strict compliance rule has two sides. On the one hand, the insurer cannot de-
mand anything greater than the warranted undertaking: in Hide v Bruce41, a warranty to 
have 20 guns did not imply sufficiency of the crew to man them. On the other hand, noth-
ing less than literal performance will do. The only potential escape may be offered by the 
de minimis non curat lex rule, which allows courts to overlook extremely minor deviations 
                                                 
 
36 Thomson v Weems (1884) 11 R (HL) 48, 51 
37 The Good Luck [1991] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 191, 202 
38 Jill Poole, “Textbook on Contract Law”, 301 
39 Pawson v Watson (1778) 2 Cowp 785, 787 
40 De Hahn v Hartley (1786) 1 T.R. 343, 346 
41 Hide v Bruce (1783) 3 Doug K B 213 
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(“mere trifles”).42 Applicability of this rule to breach of marine insurance warranties was 
discussed in Overseas Commodities Ltd v Style.43 In this case, shipped tins were warranted 
to be specifically marked by manufacturers; in fact, some tins lacked the marks. McNair J 
mentioned in his reasoning: 
“[p 558] Being satisfied that, as regards both policies, a substantial number of tins – 
well exceeding any tolerance that could be disregarded under the de minimis rule – were 
not marked[…] I have no option but to hold that the breach of the express warranty affords 
the underwriters a complete defence in this action”. 
Baris Soyer argues that the language adopted makes it clear that had only one tin 
out of thousands been defective, McNair J would have sidestepped the strict compliance 
doctrine by applying the de minimis rule.44 It is hard not to agree. However, the rule is of 
limited help, as the breach must concern only a trivial part of the whole undertaking. 
2.4.2 No requirement of materiality 
The MIA 1906 s 33(3) prescribes that a warranty must be complied with, whether it 
is material to the risk or not. The essence of this principle was formulated by Lord Eldon 
LC in Newcastle Fire Insurance45: “[…]when a thing is warranted to be of a particular na-
ture or description, it must be exactly what it is stated to be. It is no matter whether material 
or not; the only question is, is this the thing de facto I have signed?” 
“Immateriality” of a warranty can take two forms. First, a warranty may concern the 
things so random that they could not affect the risk in principle, “however absurd it may 
appear”.46 In Thomson v Weems47, Lord Blackburn explained this ambiguous approach by 
respect to contractual freedom of the parties: 
“It is competent to the contracting parties, if both agree to it and sufficiently express 
their intention so to agree, to make the actual existence of anything a condition precedent to 
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the inception of any contract[…]. And it is not of any importance whether the existence of 
that thing was or was not material; the parties would not have made it a part of the contract 
of they had not thought it material, and they have a right to determine for themselves what 
they shall deem material”. 
Next, even if a warranty concerns something that could theoretically affect the risk, 
whether it does so in fact, is irrelevant. This principle could be traced in Abbott v Shawmut 
Mutual48, where the warranty that a mortgage on the property constituted £6,600 was held 
to be breached because the real figure was £6,684. 
2.4.3 No requirement of causation 
A general approach to causation in the English insurance law is expressed in causa 
proxima or “the proximate cause” rule; see, for example, the MIA s 55(1): 
“Subject to the provisions of this Act, and unless the policy otherwise provides, the 
insurer is liable for any loss proximately caused by a peril insured against[…]”. 
Previously, there was a doubt about the content of this doctrine. One view was that 
only the immediate cause of the loss must be regarded.49 However, in Reischer v Borwick50, 
where the tug sustained damage in a collision, but afterwards was abandoned due to flood, 
the collision was held to be causa proxima, despite not being the last in time. The law re-
mained unclear until Leyland Shipping case51, where Lord Shaw said: “causation is not a 
chain, but a net[…] the cause which is truly proximate is that which is proximate in effi-
ciency”. Therefore, courts were invited to weight influence of different causes on the par-
ticular loss. 
In contrast, a causal link between the breach of warranty and the loss has never been 
relevant in insurance cases. In Hibbert v Pigou52, a ship was lost in storm, but the under-
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writer avoided liability due to the breach of convoy warranty. In non-marine Dawsons Ltd v 
Bonnin53, a lorry was warranted to park at one address, when in fact it parked at another. 
Although the misstatement about address did not enhance the risk insured, and arguably 
even reduced it, the House of Lords held that the insurer was discharged from liability. 
This feature of insurance warranties is a direct consequence of the strict compliance 
doctrine and the absence of materiality requirement; indeed, if an undertaking is not mate-
rial to the risk, it could hardly become a causa proxima for the loss. Such disregard to a 
causal element can lead to results unjustifiable from the civil law courts’ eyesight. Not sur-
prisingly, in Forsikringsaktielselskapet Vesta v Butcher54 it was called “one of the less at-
tractive features of English insurance law”. 
2.4.4 Absolute character of warranty 
Although the XVII century courts viewed an absence of fault as an excuse for non-
compliance with warranty55, Lord Mansfield ceased this practice by stating that the ques-
tion of compliance “[…]is a matter of fact; and one that admits of no latitude, no equity of 
construction, or excuse”.56 Since then, it is a general rule that “[n]o cause, however suffi-
cient; no motive, however good; no necessity, however irresistible, will excuse non-
compliance” with a warranty.57 Neither fault, nor knowledge, nor even control of the as-
sured matters. This is sometimes described as an “absolute character” of warranty.  
However, the MIA s 34(1) provides two exceptions: 
(1) The warranty ceases to be applicable to circumstances of the contract: this 
provision seems to be quite broad and, at first sight, even resembles materiality require-
ment. The principle here, however, is cessante ratione, cessat lex: the reason for a law 
ceasing, the law itself ceases. Hence, to claim this exception, the assured must prove that a 
specific state of things, which had exclusively led to introduction of a warranty, has ceased: 
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an example provided by Sir Chalmers, the drafter of the MIA 1906, is intervention of 
peace, which depreciates a wartime warranty to sail with convoy. 
(2) The warranty is rendered unlawful by any subsequent law: it is apparent that 
a warranty, as any contractual term, should not contradict the public policy. Consequently, 
if it is rendered unlawful after the formation of the contract, non-compliance is excused.  
2.4.5 Automatic discharge from liability 
The strict compliance doctrine, discussed above, is not restricted to warranties. Con-
ditions in the general contractual law also require exact compliance and cannot be substan-
tially performed.58 Hence, for a long time English courts equated insurance warranties to 
such conditions.59 However, warranties possess one feature, which distinguishes them from 
all other types of contractual terms – a remedy of “automatic discharge”, contained the 
MIA 1906 s 33(3): 
“[…]the insurer is discharged from liability as from the date of the breach of warran-
ty, but without prejudice to any liability incurred by him before that date”. 
This rule has two applications: 
(1) If a warranty relates in time to circumstances at inception of the risk, a 
breach will result in the contract never coming into existence. Here, a warranty is a condi-
tion precedent to attachment of the risk under the whole policy; if “[t]here was a falsehood, 
in respect to the condition of the thing assured; therefore, it was no contract”.60 The premi-
um is, arguably, refundable due to total failure of consideration under the MIA s 84(1). 
(2) If a warranty relates to the assured’s future conduct, a consequent breach 
has no effect on formation of the contract. The risk under policy has already attached; un-
der s 33(3), the insurer will be discharged from liability only from the date of breach. The 
question is, what does the word “discharged” mean? 
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In 1980, the Law Commission stated that a breach of warranty, similarly to a breach 
of condition in the general contract law, entitled the insurer to repudiate the policy: i.e., to 
choose whether to continue with the contract or terminate it.61 However, some years later 
the House of Lords made a revolving clarification on this point in The Good Luck.62 In this 
case, the insurer undertook to advise the mortgagee (bank) promptly if the insurance of the 
ship would cease. The ship in breach of a warranty sailed to the Arabian Guff, but the bank 
was not notified. Without further investigation, it provided loans to the shipowner and af-
terwards sued the insurer for failure to give prompt notice. In defence, the insurer claimed 
that it had not exercised the right to repudiate at the time loans were made – hence, the in-
surance was intact. Lord Goff disapproved this conclusion: 
 “[p 202] So it is laid down in s 33(3) that, subject to any express provision in the pol-
icy, the insurer is discharged from liability as from the date of breach of warranty. Those 
words are clear, they show that discharge of the insurer from liability is automatic and is 
not dependent upon any decision by the insurer to treat the contract or the insurance as at 
an end[…] 
What it does is (as section 33(3) makes plain) is to discharge the insurer from liability 
as from the date of breach. Certainly, it does not have the effect of avoiding the contract ab 
initio. Nor, strictly speaking, does it have the effect of bringing the contract to an end. It is 
possible that there may be obligations of the assured under the contract which will survive 
the discharge of the insurer from liability, as for example a continuing liability to pay a 
premium”. 
The Good Luck acknowledged existence of the exclusive remedy for a breach of 
insurance warranty. In contrast with repudiation, which requires the non-breaching party 
to make election about the fate of the contract and communicate it, this remedy operates 
automatically. Neither party needs to take any steps in relation to it; “the former policy-
holder is suddenly without cover and often quite unaware of it”.63 The insurer, however, 
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remains liable for losses incurred before the breach, see the MIA 1906 s 34(1); this differs 
from the remedy for breach of utmost faith obligations, where the contract is avoided ab 
initio. 
Lord Goff underlined that in case of automatic termination of the insurer’s liability, it 
is not correct “to speak of the contract being brought to an end, though that may be the 
practical effect”.64 This conclusion has peculiar consequences in relation to obligation to 
pay a premium. In the English insurance law, the premium is deemed to be earned at the 
commencement of the policy and, normally, is not returnable, because: “[…]if it [adven-
ture] has commenced, though it be only for twenty four hours or less, the risk is run; the 
contract is for the whole entire risk, and no part of the consideration is returned”.65 There-
fore, the assured is not only automatically left without cover in case of a slightest breach of 
warranty, but may still be obliged to pay the consequent installments of premium. 
It is clear that, even though the onus of proof of non-compliance rests on the insur-
er66, a breach of warranty defence is one of the mightiest weapons in his arsenal. The MIA 
1906 envisaged three ways of mitigating the severity of “automatic discharge” doctrine: 
(1) S 33(3) provides that the parties can contract out of automatic termination: for in-
stance, by introducing “held covered” clauses into policies; 
(2) S 34(1) provides that noncompliance is excused when, by reason of a change of 
circumstances, the warranty ceases to be applicable, or when compliance with the warranty 
is rendered unlawful by subsequent law; 
(3) S 34(3) provides insurers with right to waive a breach of warranty. 
This option has been a topic of considerable academic debates.67 In brevi, the English 
law recognizes two types of waiver: by election (1) and by estoppel (2). After The Good 
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Luck, the common view is that there is no place for election in the automatic discharge doc-
trine: “It follows that waiver by election can have no application in such a case and the 
waiver, therefore, referred to in section 34(3) of the MIA 1906 must encompass waiver by 
estoppel”.68 
Essentially, a waiver by estoppel is a promise not to rely on breach of warranty as a 
defence; the representation to that effect must be unequivocal, and relied upon in circum-
stances “where it would be inequitable for the insurer to go back on his representation”.69 
This representation may be either by words or by conduct, but not by silence, as “an auto-
matic discharge which is not required to be perfected by the insurer and inactivity can only 
favour preservation of that discharge”.70 From the practical point of view, waiver by estop-
pel puts a heavier burden of proof on the assured. Furthermore, being an equitable remedy, 
it introduces an element of discretion in the already complicated warranty regime. 
2.4.6 Later remedy is irrelevant 
The MIA 1906 s 34(2) states: 
“Where a warranty is broken, the assured cannot avail himself of the defence that the 
breach has been remedied, and the warranty complied with, before loss”. 
Previously, doubts were expressed about general applicability of this rule in marine 
insurance. The majority of cases recognized irrelevance of the later remedy71, but in Weir v 
Aberdeen72, Abbot CJ stated: “I confess that I was a little surprised at that proposition, be-
cause, if true in point of law, I fear we should find many cases indeed where it would turn 
out that the assured could have no claim upon underwrites[…]”. This inconsistency was 
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brought to an end by Quebec Marine Insurance Co v Commercial Bank of Canada73, which 
criticized the Weir v Aberdeen approach as “a proposition of perilous latitude” and con-
firmed that once a warranty is breached, the later remedy is irrelevant. 
From the assured’s perspective, irrelevance of a remedy of breach could lead to a 
number of unjustifiable results. First, much depends of a formal construction of a particular 
clause: if a provision is construed as a descriptive condition, a remedy of breach reinstates 
the insurer’s liability; but if essentially the same provision is construed as a warranty, the 
breach results in irreversible discharge. For example, in Farr v Motor Traders Mutual In-
surance74, an obligation to drive a taxi for one shift only was held to be a description of the 
risk; hence, when the owner ceased using the cab twice per day, the insurer’s liability re-
sumed – but had it been construed as a warranty, the owner would have been left without 
cover. Moreover, if the policy includes a “payment of premium warranty” – an undertaking 
that premium installments shall be paid at specified time or rate, and a payment is late, the 
assured remains without cover, but still liable to pay each future instalment required by the 
policy. 
To draw a conclusion, the warranty regime under the MIA 1906 is based on: (1) the 
“strict compliance” doctrine, which disregards issues of materiality, causation or fault; and 
(2) the “automatic discharge” doctrine, which provides the insurer with an exclusive reme-
dy of automatic termination of liability since the moment of breach. Furthermore, the as-
sured is deprived of possibility to remedy the breach of warranty, once it occurred. 
2.5 Implied and express warranties 
2.5.1 Implied warranties 
Warranties may be classified differently75; the MIA 1906 s 33(2) distinguishes be-
tween implied and express warranties in accordance with their structure. The MIA 1906 
names four implied warranties: of seaworthiness (s 39(1)), portworthiness (s 39(2)), car-
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goworthiness (s 40(2)) and legality (s 41), and six “navigation” conditions of similar ef-
fect.76 Due to the limits of this work, only two implied warranties (of seaworthiness and 
legality) are briefly discussed below, in order to demonstrate how their regulation deviates 
from the general warranty regime. 
2.5.1.1 Seaworthiness 
The MIA 1906 s 39(1) provides that: 
“In a voyage policy there is an implied warranty that at the commencement of the 
voyage the ship shall be seaworthy for the purpose of the particular adventure insured”. 
According to the MIA s 39(4), a ship is deemed seaworthy “when she is reasonably 
fit in all respects to encounter the ordinary perils of the seas of the adventure insured”. Re-
quirement to be fit in “all respects” is far reaching, but does not stand for perfection; the 
degree of seaworthiness: “[…]varies with the place, the voyage, the class of ship, or even 
the nature of the cargo”77, as well as other factors. Moreover, a warranty of seaworthiness 
does not impose a continuing duty on the assured. As Arnould puts it, “it is enough to satis-
fy this warranty that the ship be originally seaworthy for the voyage insured when she sails 
on it”.78 
The noteworthy restriction is that this warranty does not apply to time policies. As 
explained by Gibson v Small79, it would be too problematic to identify a fair moment for 
attachment of the warranty; under time policies, the shipowner on many occasions may 
have no knowledge or control over a state of the vessel. However, the MIA s 39(5) contains 
the special provision for time policies: 
“[…]where, with the privity of the assured, the ship is sent to sea in an unseaworthy 
state, the insurer is not liable for any loss attributable to unseaworthiness”. 
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Notably, the quoted rule is closer to the civil law approach to issue of seaworthiness, 
as it has regard both to culpability of the assured80 and causation; the questions is, could 
these principles be further extrapolated? For instance, the so-called “American rule” ap-
plies both to voyage and time policies, and consists of two parts: one absolute warranty of 
seaworthiness at the commencement of the voyage and one continuing “negative warran-
ty”, similar in operation to the MIA 39(5).81  
2.5.1.2 Legality 
The MIA 1906 s 41 provides that: 
“There is an implied warranty that the adventure insured is a lawful one, and that, so 
far as the assured can control the matter, the adventure shall be carried out in a lawful man-
ner”. 
Hence, the warranty of legality may be separated in two parts: 
(1) Illegality of adventure insured relates to the inception of contract. Adventures 
may be rendered illegal, for example, by public policy82; yet more often they are rendered 
illegal by statute – either by an express prohibition of a certain type of adventure83, or im-
pliedly. In order to find an implied prohibition, courts must decide: does the statute have an 
objective to prohibit a particular action? As explained in Redmond v. Smith84, noncompli-
ance with the statute “passed for a collateral purpose only” does not lead to illegality of the 
whole adventure. 
(2) Illegality during the performance of the adventure insured refers to subse-
quent misconducts of the assured. Not any illegal action constitutes a breach of warranty: if 
it is completely accidental to the marine adventure itself, the breach of warranty cannot be 
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claimed.85 However, there are hundreds of relevant maritime safety regulations; does viola-
tion of each of them constitute a breach of warranty? It seems that the Australian law gives 
an affirmative answer86, in contrast with the English law, which applies here the same test 
of “implied prohibition” as for establishing initial illegality.87 Arguably, the English ap-
proach is preferable, as it limits expansion of the warranty regime.  
It is worth noting that, in relation to the continuous warranty of legality, the MIA 
1906 s 41 envisages a deviation from the general warranty regime. Namely, it denies the 
absolute character of this warranty: if the adventure was out of control of the assured, a 
breach is excused. In Cunard v. Hyde88, the assured in such position was granted recovery 
even despite the knowledge of illegal actions of the carrier. 
Overall, the special rules on seaworthiness and legality modify the general warranty 
regime to a certain extent, via referring to issues of causation, privity or control of the as-
sured. Presumably, this demonstrates that English courts and drafters of the MIA under-
stood that, at least in some circumstances, the general warranty regime was capable of pro-
ducing unfair outcomes and should be avoided. 
2.5.2 Express warranties 
The MIA 1906 s 35(2) provides that in marine insurance, an express warranty must 
be included in, or written upon, the policy, or must be contained in some document incor-
porated by reference into the policy. There is plethora of various types of express warran-
ties: the MIA 1906 mentions warranties of neutrality (s 36) and good safety (s 38); the In-
stitute Warranties 1/7/76 establish geographical warranties; Institute Time Clauses - Hulls 
(ITCH) 1/11/95 identify: 
˗ the towage and salvage warranty (ITCH(95) cl.1.); 
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˗ the disbursements warranty (ITCH(95) cl.22); 
˗ the classification clause (ITCH(95) cl.4.1), which imposes on the assured a duty to 
ensure that the ship possesses and maintains her class. 
Although the Classification Clause is not expressly referred to as “warranty”, the 
ITCH(95) cl.4.2 implies that conclusion by providing a remedy of automatic termination of 
liability in case of breach, in full accordance with the MIA s 33(3) and The Good Luck89 
doctrine; though “if the Vessel is at sea at such date the Underwriters' discharge from lia-
bility is deferred until arrival at her next port”. In addition, cl.5.1 refers to automatic termi-
nation of contract in case of breach of duties under cl.4.1; cl.5.2 envisages the same effect 
for any change of ownership, flag, management, charter on a bareboat basis, or requisition 
of the Vessel. Notably, the issues of classification and materiality are so fundamental for 
insurance contracts, that even some civil law countries introduced the warranty-like regime 
for them.90 
 
Overall, after considering the main characteristics of the warranty regime under the 
MIA 1906, it is safe to conclude that warranties are the powerful instrument of the risk ad-
ministration for the insurer. The severity of the warranty regime can even be superfluous, 
as it does not allow considerations of materiality, causation or culpability to improve a po-
sition of the assured. Although there are exemptions and deviations from the general rules 
(for example, the MIA s 39(5) and s 41), as well as mitigation instruments (waiver, “held 
covered” clauses, etc.), outcomes of individual cases may still be unjustifiable. However, is 
it possible to avoid use of warranties completely? Here, experience from the civil law coun-
tries could be relevant; a perfect example is Norway, where a comprehensive set of marine 
insurance rules is embodied in the agreed document, with a balanced approach to interests 
of assureds and insurers – the Nordic Marine Insurance Plan. 
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3 Norwegian approach to alteration of risk 
Insurance relationships in Norway are primarily regulated by the general Insurance 
Contracts Act (ICA) 1989. However, under Section 1-3(c) and (e), the ICA is not mandato-
ry for insurance that relates to ships, which are subject to registration according to the 
Norwegian Maritime Code 1994, or goods in international transit. Hence, the most signifi-
cant role in marine insurance is left to marine insurance plans: standardized conditions 
drafted jointly by insurers, assureds and other interested parties. The latest version of these 
conditions is the Nordic Marine Insurance Plan (NMIP) 2013, based on the Norwegian 
Marine Insurance Plan 1996. Although the NMIP is not binding for parties until incorpo-
rated into contract, it explicitly illustrates the common practices of the Norwegian insur-
ance market. 
3.1 General provisions on alteration of risk 
Norway, as the majority of civil law countries, has adopted the doctrine of alteration 
of risk to regulate a continuing duty of the assured not to undermine fundamental estima-
tions behind the insurance contract. Provisions on alteration of risk in the NMIP are divided 
into two groups: general regulations, § 3-8 to 3-13, and special rules, § 3-14 to § 3-21. 
Conceptual definition of alteration of the risk is provided by the NMIP, § 3-8, 1st para-
graph: 
“An alteration of the risk occurs when there is a change in the circumstances which, 
according to the contract, are to form the basis of the insurance, and the risk is thereby al-
tered contrary to the implied conditions of the contract”. 
Therefore, a “true” alteration of risk is distinguished from irrelevant changes of cir-
cumstances by two criteria91: 
(1) There must have been a change of a fortuitous nature. Such “change” may in-
clude both the alteration of subject matter insured, and the pure increase of risk; yet, simi-
larly to the English approach, a mere increase of intensity of a peril insured will not consti-
tute an alteration of risk; 
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(2) The change must amount to frustration of the fundamental expectations up-
on which the contract was based. Here, a construction of the policy in accordance with 
general principles of the insurance and contract law is needed to decide, whether it would 
be reasonable to give the insurer opportunity to apply the sanctions provided in the NMIP. 
Speaking of sanctions for alteration of risk, professor Trine-Lise Wilhelmsen argues 
that the civil law jurisdictions normally connect them with the following issues92: 
(1) Culpability of the assured; 
(2) How the insurer would have reacted had he known about the alteration of risk 
when the contract was entered into; 
(3) How the alteration of risk has influenced the casualty or the extent of the loss. 
Hence, the questions of culpability, materiality and causation are taken into account 
in different proportions, in contrast with the English warranty regime. The civil law ap-
proach is reflected in the NMIP § 3-9, which provides that if the assured intentionally 
caused or agreed to an alteration of the risk, further sanctions will depend on the degree of  
subjective materiality of the alteration to the insurer: 
(1) If the insurer would not have accepted the insurance, had he known of alteration 
in advance, the contract is not binding for him. The Commentary to the NMIP § 3-9, with 
reference to § 3-3, further clarifies that there is no need for the insurer to additionally can-
cel the contract to avoid future liability93; 
(2) If the insurer would have accepted the risk, but on different terms, then it is possi-
ble for him to avoid liability only if there is a causal link between the loss and the altera-
tion. 
Furthermore, the NMIP § 3-10 provides that if an alteration of the risk occurs, the in-
surer has a right to cancel the insurance for future by giving a fourteen days’ notice, when-
ever the alteration was caused by the assured or by circumstances outside of his control.94 
Nevertheless, the NMIP 3-12 1st paragraph precludes the insurer from invoking both § 3-9 
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and § 3-10 if the alteration of the risk has ceased to be material to him. Consequently, the 
Norwegian approach, as opposed to English one, generally does not allow reliance on im-
material changes of risk. 
3.2 Special provisions on alteration of risk 
As mentioned above, the NMIP contains special provisions for certain types of altera-
tions of risk in § 3-14 to § 3-21. Previously, § 3-22 of the Norwegian Plan 1996 regulated 
the duty of the assured to ensure the ship’s seaworthiness “at such a time that it would have 
been possible for him to intervene”.95 In 2007, in accordance with the newly adopted Ship 
Safety and Security Act, this rule was avoided. Those defects that previously would have 
rendered the ship unseaworthy, nowadays will normally represent a breach of safety regula-
tions.96 This amendment, however, was not detrimental to the assured’s position, as pres-
ence of both causation and fault is necessary to invoke the breach of safety regulation.97 
Arguably, there is also an implied requirement of materiality, because a minor or irrelevant 
breach is not likely to cause the loss. 
 The NMIP § 3-16, which addresses illegal activities, also requires culpability of the 
assured and causal connection between breach and loss to free the insurer from liability. 
However, the NMIP knows exceptions from these general requirements. First, there are 
three provisions with a suspensive effect, which resemble “conditions descriptive of the 
risk” in the English insurance law: 
(1) Sailing in excluded trading areas (§ 3-15, 3rd par.); 
(2) Suspension of the insurance in the event of requisition (§ 3-17); 
(3) Removal of the ship to a repair yard (§ 3-20, 2nd par.) 
Furthermore, there are two provisions on loss of main class (§ 3-14) and change of 
ownership (§ 3-21), which provide a remedy of automatic termination of the insurance 
without regard to elements of causation or fault. Although they are not expressly called 
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“warranties”, there is little doubt that these provisions were designed under the influence of 
the warranty regime. 
3.3 Warranty-like provisions 
The reason for introduction of the warranty-like provisions on loss of the main class 
and change of ownership in the NMIP § 3-14 and § 3-21 rests in a fundamental character of 
these issues to marine policies. Presumably, loss of class and change of ownership of the 
vessel affect the essence of insurance so significantly that, even if the assured were not 
blameworthy for such alteration98, it would be unfair to keep the insurer up to his original 
promise. 
(1) The NMIP § 3-14 provision on loss of the main class, analogous to the 
ITCH (95) cl.4.1.1, envisages both: 
˗ The affirmative warranty that the vessel has class at the inception of insurance (§ 3-
14 1st paragraph). In case of breach, the insurer never comes at risk under the policy; 
˗ The continuous duty of the assured to maintain the main class (§ 3-14 2nd paragraph). 
In case of breach, the policy automatically terminates, cf. the ITCH (95) cl.5.1. 
(2) The NMIP § 3-21 provides that “the insurance terminates if the ownership of the 
ship changes by sale or in any other manner”. The assured’s continuous undertaking to 
maintain ownership is significantly narrower than the ITCH (95) cl.5.2, and does not em-
brace situations of requisition (the NMIP § 3-18), change of flag or management (the 
NMIP § 3-8 2nd paragraph), and so on. 
It should be underlined that neither the NMIP § 3-14, nor the NMIP § 3-21 make a 
difference between “termination of the insurance [contract]” and “discharge from liability”, 
which is the true remedy for a breach of warranty in the English insurance law.99 The dif-
ference may be relevant in relation to surviving duties of the assured: for example, to pay 
the premium. Nevertheless, such aspects of these provisions, as disregard to causation and 
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culpability of the assured, resemble the English warranty regime and represent a huge de-
parture from the general system of the NMIP. 
In traveaux preparatoires for the ICA, legislators expressed considerable skepticism 
about the place of warranties in the Norwegian insurance; it was noted that in individual 
cases courts might apply Section 36 of the Contracts Act (Avtaleloven), regarding unrea-
sonable contracts, to set aside warranty clauses.100 However, such outcome seems rather 
unlikely: first, courts are reluctant to apply Section 36 to contracts between professional 
parties, which are the majority of marine insurance policies. Next, the NMIP § 3-14 and § 
3-21 in particular are provisions of the agreed document, and courts may not want to dis-
turb its inner balance. The fact that analogous warranties exist in other jurisdictions may 
also be relevant. 
A breach of warranty provision has not been frequently claimed before Norwegian 
courts. In ND 1981.347 Vall Sun, the P&I insurer argued that it was an implied condition 
for membership in the insurance group – hence, a condition precedent to the insurance cov-
er (warranty) – that the ship had class. As Vall Sun was deprived of her class at the time of 
the casualty, the insurer was free from liability, regardless of causation between the loss of 
class and the casualty. The court disagreed, on following grounds: 
(1) In this particular case, the cancelation of class occurred from a pure misunder-
standing between the assured and the classification society, so that the court found it more 
just to disregard it completely.101 Arguably, the position of English courts would be stricter 
in this respect102; 
(2) Even if class was lost, the Norwegian Plan 1964, § 31 2nd subparagraph, expressly 
stated that such loss was a general alteration of risk, which only entitled the insurer to can-
cel insurance after notice (§ 33). As the NMIP 2013 § 3-21 provides another solution, now-
adays the insurer presumably might have been more successful. For instance, in Tor Hol-
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landia103, the court not only construed a contractual provision as a warranty, but also con-
firmed that to trigger legal effects of its breach, causal link between the breach and the loss 
was not required. That could be a step towards recognition of the utility of warranties in the 
Norwegian insurance. 
 
Overall, apart from few exceptions, the Norwegian approach to alteration of risk is 
based on notions of materiality, causation and, to some extent, culpability of the assured. 
This demonstrates that insurers can be provided with a sufficient legal protection without 
the shelter of the extensive warranty regime. Hence, many minds have searched in the 
Norwegian experience an impulse for reform of marine insurance in the common law coun-
tries.104 
4 Reform of the warranty regime 
4.1 Critique and support of warranties 
4.1.1 Drawbacks of warranties 
The superfluous severity of the warranty regime in the insurance law could not have 
passed unnoticed. For a long time, it draw critique of academics, market players, and even 
judicial authorities. In Hussain v Brown105, Saville LJ described warranties as “draconian 
terms”, because “[t]he breach of such a warranty produces an automatic cancellation of 
cover, and the fact that a loss may have no connection with that breach is irrelevant”. 
In 1980 Report, the Law Commission concluded that the law relating to non-
disclosure and breach of warranty was “undoubtedly in need of reform”; in particular, it 
appeared unjust that106: 
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(1) An insurer could demand strict compliance with a warranty which was immaterial 
to the risk (no materiality requirement); 
(2) An insurer could reject a claim for any breach, no matter how irrelevant that 
breach to the loss (no causation requirement); 
(3) In respect of “basis of the contract” clauses, an insurer could avoid the liability 
upon purely technical grounds. 
In 2006 Issues paper, the Law Commission has referred mostly to the same flaws of 
the warranty regime, adding that it seems unjust that107: 
(1) An insurer may refuse to pay a claim, though the breach has been remedied (ir-
relevance of later remedy); 
(2) An insurer is entitled for the whole amount of premium despite the termination of 
cover, which appears especially unfair in case of breach of so-called “premium warran-
ties”.108 
Therefore, the typical characteristics of insurance warranties may turn them into a 
source of striking injustice to the assured, “technical traps for the benefit of the insurer 
written into the fine print of policies which are not worth the paper upon which they are 
written”.109 The problem is not merely theoretical: Mactavish, the British research group 
on insurance governance, in 2014 reported that warranties were the third most common 
ground for insurance disputes.110 
Another reason for concern rests in the process of internationalization of the insur-
ance law. It is viewed mostly as a distant perspective, but the Law Commission agrees that 
there are European initiatives, which may eventually influence framework of the insurance 
law. However, many English practices are perceived in the civil law countries as both “un-
fair and unusual”.111 The warranty regime is especially problematic, as the prospect of leav-
ing the assured without cover for a minor and/or non-causative breach is rather peculiar for 
                                                 
 
107 Issues paper 2 “Warranties” (2006), ss 5.3 and 7.77 respectively 
108 See discussion in Chapter 2, s 2.4.5 
109 John Hare, “The Omnipotent Warranty: England v The World”, 53, with reference to Zurich 
Insurance Company v Morrison [1942] 1 ER 529 and Anderson v Fitzgerald (1853) 10 ER 551 
110 The Law Commission Report No 353 (2014), s 14.5 
111 Consultation paper No182 (2007) ss 1.84-1.85 
33 
continental systems. Even the common law countries have revised the traditional approach 
to certain extent.112 Hence, the warranty regime, as codified by the MIA 1906, creates a 
hindrance for harmonization of the insurance law. 
A perfect illustration of collision between the English and the civil law approaches is 
Vesta v Butcher113, where a Norwegian fish farm was insured against the loss of fish under 
the Norwegian law, but the risk was reinsured in London. The policy contained a condition 
of keeping a constant watch, which was never complied with; however, there was no causa-
tion between non-compliance and the subsequent loss of fish in a storm. The Norwegian 
insurer paid, while the English underwriters claimed a breach of warranty. Remarkably, the 
House of Lords was able to sidestep this defence only by stating that, in this particular case, 
the reinsurers had agreed to cover all risks embraced by the original policy. 
Finally, English insurance companies should also be interested in keeping the London 
market in accord with international standards, in order to preserve its attractiveness for new 
clients. For instance, the Association of British Insurers (ABI) confirmed that a reform re-
lating to the consequences of a breach of warranty was necessary, though “in business in-
surance the guiding principle should be freedom of contract”.114 
4.1.2 Benefits of warranties 
Nevertheless, some respondents advocated before the Law Commissions in the UK 
and in Australia that warranties are a necessary feature of insurance contracts. In sum, the 
arguments presented on this point are115: 
(1) Safety: warranties serve as a measure to promote high standards of the assured’s 
performance in respect of seaworthiness, legality, compliance with class recommendations, 
and so on. Hence, an abolition of warranties could lead to unwanted relaxation in these 
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areas. As counterargument, it may be said that such public policy issues should not be 
dealt with through the regulation of private contractual relationships. 
(2) Simplicity: warranties help to avoid a burdensome process of proving the pres-
ence of elements of causation and culpability. However, this advantage has one-sided char-
acter, as it primarily benefits the insurer. 
(3) Contractual freedom: the MIA s 33(3) allows the parties to contract out of con-
sequences of breach envisaged by statute. Yet it should be remembered that shipowners 
and even brokers have different levels of expertise: they may simply miss a true meaning of 
the policy clause, especially if it is drafted without the use of the word “warranty”. 
(4) Industry self-regulation: insurers frequently claim that interference into the war-
ranty regime is not needed, because they already tend to avoid reliance on minor or non-
causative breaches. Although such practice exists116, its non-obligatory character exposes 
the assured to the insurer’s discretion. 
However, there is a number of other methods adopted by courts and by actors of the 
insurance industry in England and other common law countries in order to ameliorate the 
warranty regime. It is worth examining them prior to a discussion of legislative reforms. 
4.2 Attempts to mitigate the warranty regime in the UK and other common 
law countries by judicial interpretation of policy and introduction of 
special policy provisions 
4.2.1 Construction of policy by courts 
There are two main methods of mitigating the harsh consequences of a breach of war-
ranty: the policy itself may contain special provisions to this effect, or it could be done 
through judicial interpretation of contractual clauses. For that purpose, the common law 
courts have adopted two approaches: 
(1) Restrictive construction of warranty; 
(2) Construction of warranty as other contractual term. 
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4.2.1.1 Restrictive construction of warranty 
For a long time the common law courts have recognized that, due to the severity of 
the warranty regime, its applicability must be restricted by judicial interpretation: i.e., any 
ambiguity in a warranty should be construed in accordance with the contra proferentum 
rule. The essence of this rule in marine insurance context was explicitly formulated in Win-
ter v Employers Fire Insurance Co117: “[…]marine contracts are strictly construed against 
the insurer and favorably to the insured, and where two interpretations are possible, that 
which will indemnify the insured will be adopted”.  
Supportive principles of restrictive construction may be summarized as follows118: 
(1) If insurers wish a warranty to have draconian consequences, “then it is up to them 
to stipulate for it in clear terms”119; 
(2) If the literal wording of a warranty is inconsistent with a reasonable and business-
like interpretation, it is likely that the parties have not intended such result; 
(3) A literal interpretation of a warranty must not be inconsistent with other policy 
terms; 
(4) Furthermore, a warranty may be construed as being relevant to only some risks 
covered in the policy. For example, in Printpak v AGF Insurance Ltd120, the policy was 
divided into different sections; the court found that the warranty to install a burglar alarm 
referred only to the theft section, but not to fire risks. However, this principle has limited 
application: in Sugar Hut121, the policy covered four nightclubs. The court stated, obiter, 
that as four places were the subject matter of one insurance, the breach of warranty in one 
club would leave all of them uncovered. Therefore, even restrictive construction of warran-
ty clauses could not always help the assured. 
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4.2.1.2 Construction of warranty as suspensive condition 
The second method of mitigation adopted by courts is that a clause may be construed 
not as a warranty, but as other contractual term – namely, a condition descriptive of the 
risk. Non-compliance with such condition only suspends the insurance cover, which pro-
vides the assured with an opportunity to remedy the breach. English courts have applied 
this reasoning in a number of non-marine insurance cases.122 In the recent Kler Knitwear v 
Lombard General Insurance Co Ltd123, the contract expressly stated that an undertaking to 
have sprinklers inspected in 30 days was a warranty; non-compliance was described as 
terminating the cover “whether it increases the risk or not”. Despite the fact that the word-
ing of the policy was so precise, Mr Justice Morland held that the term was a suspensive 
condition, because it would “be utterly absurd and make no rational business sense” to con-
strue it as a warranty. 
Kler Knitwear decision raised considerable criticism.124 If the clearest language of the 
policy may be viewed as not indicative of the parties’ intentions, an uncertainty about legal 
effects of contractual provisions is created. Moreover, limits of application of this method 
of judicial interpretation are blurred, as demonstrated by two cases: The Newfoundland 
Explorer125 and The Resolute126. In both cases, the vessels were warranted crewed “at all 
times”; the loss occurred while they were either berthed or safely tied up. In The New-
foundland Explorer, the court construed the clause literally, including time at berth; in The 
Resolute, the warranty was held to refer only to navigation time. Hence, although the courts 
have benevolent intentions and try to reach fair outcomes in individual cases, they intro-
duce inconsistency into the insurance law. 
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4.2.1.3 Role of courts in other common law jurisdictions 
The majority of common law countries share a tendency of “[…]increasingly discard-
ing the more extreme features of English law which allow an insurer to avoid liability on 
grounds which do not relate to the occurrence of the loss”.127 Partially, it is due to attempts 
of local courts to ameliorate the “classical” warranty regime. 
In Canada, courts are inclined to find a term to be a “true warranty” only in “situa-
tions where the warranty is material to the risk and the breach has a bearing on the loss”.128 
This is illustrated by The Bamcell II case129, where the policy contained a clause “warrant-
ed that a watchman is stationed on board the Bamcell II each night”. The court construed it 
as a suspensive condition, applicable only at night; so, despite the breach, the insurer was 
liable for the loss, which occurred during daytime. This practice, however, is criticized on 
the same footing as Kler Knitwear: as harming a fine line between warranties and other 
types of policy terms.130 
In the USA, a break with the English approach began with Wilburn Boat case131, 
where The Supreme Court held that marine insurance contracts were governed by state law. 
As the result, nowadays a status of warranties differs from state to state. For instance, in 
Texas a causal connection test is adopted, while in New York it is required that warranties 
must materially affect the risk.132 
Overall, judicial authorities throughout the common law world have supported the 
idea of taking into considerations an immaterial and non-causative character of the breach. 
It allows to provide justice in individual cases, but on a greater scale, the law becomes 
more uncertain and unpredictable. Therefore, other ways of amelioration of the warranty 
regime are required. 
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4.2.2 Self-regulation of the industry 
4.2.2.1 “Held covered” clauses 
The harsh outcomes of the warranty regime may be avoided at the stage of formation 
of the policy. One option for those who wish to contract out of the statutory envisaged con-
sequences of a breach is to use “held covered” clauses.133 The typical effect of such provi-
sion is that, in case of a breach of a specified warranty, the insurance cover will continue 
under two conditions: (1) a notice must be given to the insurer; (2) essential variations to 
the contract (i.a., concerning premium) must be renegotiated. If there is disagreement be-
tween the parties on the last point, the assured may end up uncovered.134 Hence, the mitiga-
tion offered by “held covered” clauses has certain limits. 
4.2.2.2 The International Hull Clauses 2003 
In the attempt to ameliorate marine insurance practices, the London market has pro-
duced the International Hull Clauses (IHC) 2003. One of the objectives of these Clauses is 
a more balanced approach to the warranty regime. Primarily, the navigation provisions are 
not construed as warranties, in contrast with the ITCH(95) cl.1 and the Institute Warranties 
1/7/76. Under the IHC 2003 (cl.10-11), navigating outside permitted areas leads only to 
suspension of cover. Moreover, restriction of cover is envisaged for a failure to comply 
with the specified statutory or Class requirements (cl.14.4.1 –14.4.2): i.e., insurers shall not 
be liable for any loss “attributable to such breach”. 
Reduction of a number of warranties and limited introduction of a causation element 
were welcomed among academics.135 Nevertheless, it should be remembered that the 
Clauses are not obligatory; their incorporation into insurance policies depends on free will 
of the parties. 
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4.2.2.3 Non-marine insurance: the Statement of General Insurance Practice 1986 
Notably, the Association of British Insurers (ABI) in Section 2(b)(iii) of the State-
ment of General Insurance Practice (SGIP) 1986 indicated that the insurer should not ap-
peal to a breach of warranty “where the circumstances of the loss are unconnected with the 
breach unless fraud is involved”. Therefore, insurers were recommended not to rely on 
technical (non-causative) breaches, except for situations when “they suspect fraud but are 
unable to prove it”.136 
Non-compliance with the SGIP 1986 could be detrimental to the insurer’s reputation; 
however, this document is not supported by legal enforcement. Furthermore, the SGIP 
1986 does not concern marine insurance: here, the assured depends on the insurer’s deci-
sion to adopt a similar practice independently and adhere to it.137 
 
In sum, the fact that marine insurance warranties allow the insurer to rely on any 
breach, regardless of its relation to the loss, is a widely acknowledged problem. Both judi-
cial authorities and actors of the insurance industry have developed various instruments for 
amelioration of the warranty regime codified in the MIA 1906. Among them are: mitigat-
ing interpretation of policies by courts, adaptation of special provisions by contracting par-
ties, and even insurers’ self-implied restrictions. However, neither of these solutions seem 
final, as they leave too much to the discretion of courts, or insurers. Therefore, a need for a 
legislative reform has been recognized in the UK. 
4.3 Legislative reform of the warranty regime in the UK 
4.3.1 Previous proposals for reform in the UK 
In 1980, the Law Commission introduced an ambitious project of revision of the Eng-
lish insurance law. One of its main concerns was unjustified use of warranties to deny cov-
er: (1) when a warranty was not material to the risk; (2) or when a breach of even material 
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warranty was irrelevant (non-causative) to the loss.138 For that reason, the Law Commis-
sion recommended that the assured should be able to raise the following defences against a 
claim that a warranty was breached:139 
(1) The warranty in question was not material to the risk: i.e., it would not have in-
fluenced a prudent underwriter’s assessment of the risk; 
(2) The warranty had another commercial purpose: i.e., it was introduced against 
the risk “which does not include the event which gave rise to the claim”;  
(3) The breach of warranty could not have increased the risk that the event, which 
gave rise to the claim, would occur in the way in which it did in fact occur. Although this 
proposal is sometimes referred to as a “causation test”, it may be more correct to describe it 
as an extended materiality requirement. There may be a number of situations where a 
breach increases the risk in general without causing or contributing to the particular loss.140 
These proposals were not implemented in practice due to resistance of the industry; 
but even if they were, neither of them related to marine, aviation and transport (MAT) in-
surance. The Law Commission was of a view that long-established rules worked satisfacto-
ry for MAT and created “a context of certainty of law and practice”.141 However, the situa-
tion has changed since 1980. The share of the London insurance market on the international 
scale has decreased, while other markets, such as Norwegian one, have gained attractive-
ness, partially due to more balanced solutions for issues of alteration of risk.142 Hence, the 
need for a thorough reform of the warranty regime was acknowledged, at least in order to 
bring the English law “closer in line with international standards”.143 
                                                 
 
138 “Insurance Law” (1980) Law Com No104, ss 6.9(a), 6.9(b) 
139 Ibid. The Draft Bill, clauses 8(1), 10(5)(a) and 10(5)(b) respectively 
140 See, for example, Issues paper 2 “Warranties” (2006), ss. 7.72 – 7.73; cf. Report No 353 (2014), 
s 14.23 
141 “Insurance Law” (1980) Law Com No104, s 2.8 
142 Baris Soyer, “Warranties in Marine Insurance”, 205 
143 Consultation paper No204 (2012), s 16.3  
41 
4.3.2 Legislative reforms in other common law countries 
Although the common law world inherited the English approach to insurance warran-
ties, in New Zealand and Australia it was revised with the help of legislative reforms. The 
experience of these counties, as well as various attitudes to issues of materiality and causa-
tion, were taken into account by the UK legislators during the recent reform. 
4.3.2.1 New Zealand 
In New Zealand, the warranty regime has been reformed by Section 11 of the Insur-
ance Law Reform Act 1977. It is a complicated provision, which relates not only to warran-
ties, but also to conditions descriptive of the risk or excluding liability. In sum, if there was 
an event or a change in circumstances of subjective materiality to the insurer, he remains 
liable, “if the insured proves on the balance of probability that the loss in respect of which 
the insured seeks to be indemnified was not caused or contributed to by the happening of 
such events or the existence of such circumstances”. 
This formula is broader than mere causation requirement, especially in light of the 
causa proxima doctrine, and more lenient towards insurers. However, Section 11 has drawn 
criticism as too insured-friendly: in 1998, the New Zealand Law Reform Commission 
(NZLRC) proposed that a causal connection test should not apply to a provision which: 
(1) defines the age, identity, qualifications or experience of a driver, a pilot, or an op-
erator of a chattel; 
(2) defines the permitted geographical area; 
(3) excludes loss for use of a vehicle, aircraft or other chattel for commercial purpos-
es.144 
The possible rationale behind this proposal is that the listed circumstances actually 
mark the scope of the risk indemnified under the policy, so that every change of them 
equals going outside of this scope. Even the civil law countries know examples of special 
provisions, comparable in effect: see, for instance, the NMIP 3-15, 3rd paragraph, on sus-
pension of cover during the sail in excluded trading areas. The question is, however, what 
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exceptions from the causation test are justified? Some of the proposals of the NZLRC 
might seem rather arbitrary; this problem was taken into account during the recent reform 
in the UK.145 
4.3.2.2 Australia 
In contrast with the NZ Act 1977, the Australian Insurance Contract Act (ICA) 1984 
does not govern marine insurance. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that Section 54 of 
the ICA 1984 introduces both materiality and causation requirements for non-compliance 
with terms that exclude or restrict cover. The insurer may not refuse to pay if: 
(1) The insured’s act could not reasonably be regarded as being capable of causing 
or contributing to the loss (Section 54(2)); or 
(2) The insured proves that the loss (isolated part of it) was not caused by its act 
(Sections 54(3) and 54(4)). 
The Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) found Section 54 generally unsuit-
able for marine insurance, but acknowledged that “[i]t is not equitable to allow an insurer 
the right to avoid liability where there is only a minor or immaterial breach”; hence, a caus-
al link between the loss and the breach of warranty should be required in form of the causa 
proxima, “a well understood insurance law concept”.146 Although this proposal was not 
applied in practice, it demonstrates willingness of the Australian market to introduce an 
element of causation into the warranty regime. 
4.3.3 2006-2015 reform process in the UK 
Despite extensive non-legislative and legislative attempts to mitigate the warranty re-
gime, for a long time the relevant MIA 1906 provisions have remained a source of potential 
injustice.147 Therefore, in January 2006, the UK Law Commission and the Scottish Law 
Commission started a joint project devoted to reformation of the English insurance law. 
Their aim was to review its most unfair and outdated traits, including the legal effects of 
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147 See discussion in Chapter 4, s 4.1.1. 
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warranties. According to a content of the Commissions’ proposals, they can be separated 
into two groups: 
4.3.3.1 2006-2007 proposals 
At the first stage of work, the UK Law Commission prepared Issues Paper 2 “War-
ranties” (November 2006) and Consultation Paper No182 “Misrepresentation, Non-
disclosure and Breach of Warranty by the Insured” (July 2007). Their distinguishing fea-
ture was the proposal to introduce a causation element into the warranty regime. That, 
according to the Law Commission, was the necessary step to defeat “the greatest and most 
obvious problem with the law on warranties” – i.e., a termination of cover “for technical 
breaches that have nothing to do with the loss in question”.148 
Originally, the Law Commission was prepared to adopt the New Zealand “purposive 
approach” and introduce the causation test not only for warranties, but also for other terms 
“that enable the insurer to refuse to pay a claim for events or circumstances that add to the 
risk of loss” (descriptive conditions).149 However, in 2007 the proposal was limited to war-
ranties “in the narrow sense”.150 This decision was partly inspired by New Zealand theory 
that the causation element is unfit for terms defining age, experience, etc. Therefore, it was 
feared that the causation test, common to both types of terms, would require a blurry list of 
exclusions. 
The other question was, what degree of causation must be sufficient to discharge the 
insurer from liability? Again, the Law Commission considered experience from the UK and 
other common law countries. The 1980 Report’s proposal that the relevant breach of war-
ranty should “increase the risk”, was considered to be too unfavorable to the assured. In 
contrast, the Australian approach that required the loss to be “caused” by the breach was 
considered too generous, because it implied that the breach must be “a dominant or major 
cause of the loss”.151 
                                                 
 
148 Issues paper 2 “Warranties” (2006), ss 7.66-7.67 
149 Issues paper 2 “Warranties” (2006), s 7.88 
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The Law Commission stated that to discharge the insurer from liability, it should be 
enough that the breach contributed “in any way to the accident”; hence, it adopted the for-
mula, which was closer to New Zealand approach: 
“[T]he policyholder should be entitled to be paid a claim if it can prove on the bal-
ance of probability that the event or circumstances constituting the breach of warranty did 
not contribute to the loss”.152 
By comparison, the NMIP, in cases of combination of perils, distinguishes between 
relevant and non-relevant causes; as Commentary to § 2-13 1st par. indicates, the lower 
limit required for an effect of a cause to be “relevant” is circa 10-15%. Apparently, the rule 
envisaged by the Law Commission sets a lower limit: from the literal wording of the Pa-
pers, it follows that even a breach of warranty with 1% contribution to the loss terminates 
insurance cover. However, those are only theoretical speculations, as English courts did not 
have a chance to apply the rule in practice. 
The 2006-2007 proposal to introduce the causation test into the warranty regime trig-
gered a mixed reaction. In academic circles, this idea received an extensive support; as Sir 
Longmore (Lord Justice of Appeal) noted, “most commentators appear to think that it 
would be sufficient if the law were reformed to allow insurers only to rely on breach of 
warranty if the breach is a cause of the loss”.153 Several consultees related to the industry 
were also supportive: for instance, AIRMIC (the UK association for risk and insurance 
management professionals) called such reform an “essential change to insurance contract 
law”.154 
On the other hand, many respondents presented arguments against the proposal, 
namely155: 
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(1) Causation is a difficult principle to apply in practice, because it requires a 
closer assessment of a chain of events. What is more, insurers might try to compensate in-
creased investigation costs through higher premiums; 
 (2) The causation test is not appropriate for all terms, because some warranties 
may be relevant to the risk without being causative to the loss (for example, those that con-
cern past claims to the assured, relevant to assessment of possibility of future claims); 
(3) Undue formalism. As mentioned above, the Law Commission proposed the 
causal connection test only for warranties, but in practice, a similar term may be formulated 
as a descriptive condition. Hence, effect of a particular provision would depend only on 
formalistic approach to its construction. 
These arguments do not seem fully persuasive. First, the experience of civil law 
countries evidences that it is possible to apply the causation test in practice, without dispro-
portionate escalation of costs or premiums. Second, in situations where an undertaking 
generally affects the risk, but the particular breach is purely irrelevant, the causation test 
could allow achieving fairer results.156 Third, it is certainly preferable to treat warranties 
the same way as suspensive conditions; yet it does not necessarily mean a complete aban-
donment of the causation test. In 2006, the Law Commission was prepared to introduce it 
for both types of terms; although the industry and courts would have required a longer time 
to adapt to that solution, it seemed as a huge step towards modernization of the English 
insurance law. 
However, heavy critique of the causation requirement demonstrated that the indus-
try was not prepared for such a striking reform. Concerns about complexity of investigation 
and proof, as well as uncertainty and potential formalism of outcomes en masse persuaded 
the Law Commission to abandon the causal connection test. Hence, other instruments were 
needed to ameliorate the warranty regime. 
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4.3.3.2 2012-2014 proposals 
On the next stage of work, the Law Commission prepared Consultation paper “Insur-
ance Contract Law: The Business Insured’s Duty of Disclosure and the Law of Warranties” 
(June 2012) and Report “Insurance Contract Law: Business Disclosure; Warranties; Insur-
ers’ Remedies for Fraudulent Claims; and Late Payment” (July 2014). In sum, both docu-
ments named three main proposals in relation to the warranty regime157: 
(1) To treat warranties as suspensive conditions. This proposal goes to the root of 
the warranty regime, as it abolishes the “automatic discharge” doctrine, established by the 
MIA 1906 s 33(3); 
(2) To introduce the rule that terms designed to reduce the risk of loss of a par-
ticular type (or at a particular time or place) should not affect losses of a different 
kind. Notably, this proposal was designed as an alternative for the causal connection test; 
(3) To abolish “basis of the contract” clauses. This measure was envisaged pri-
marily for non-marine commercial policies, where such clauses allowed the insurer to rely 
on minor mistakes in proposal forms. Due to the fact that the MIA s 35(2) sets out strict 
requirements for introduction of an express warranty into the marine policy, such clauses 
are of minor relevance for the marine insurance.158 
In July 2014, the Insurance Bill, based on the work of the Law Commission, was in-
troduced into Parliament; it received Royal Assent on 12 February 2015 and became the 
Insurance Act 2015.159 The Act reflects all abovementioned proposals (Sections 9 – 11); 
therefore, it embodies a cardinal reform of the “classical” warranty regime. 
4.3.3.3 The Insurance Act 2015 
A few points about application of the Insurance Act 2015 should be mentioned. First, 
the majority of provisions of the Act, including those relevant to warranties, enter into ef-
                                                 
 
157 Consultation paper No204 (2012), s 11.22; Report No 353 (2014), s 12.6 
158 See, for example, Arnould, “On the Law of Marine Insurance and Average”, 827. 
For that reason, Section 9 of the Insurance Act 2015, abolishing “basis of the contract” clauses, is 
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fect from August 2016.160 Until that time, the MIA 1906 continues to apply. Next, the In-
surance Act 2015 provides that in non-consumer insurance the parties may contract out 
of statutory provisions and introduce a term “which would put the insured in a worse posi-
tion” (for instance, a warranty clause with a remedy of automatic termination of liability), 
if the requirement of transparency is satisfied. Namely: 
(1) The insurer must take sufficient steps to draw the disadvantageous term to the as-
sured’s attention before its incorporation into the contract. Alternatively, the insured must 
have actual knowledge of the term; 
(2) The disadvantageous term must be clear and unambiguous as to its effect.161 
Thus, the use of warranties in their present form will not be completely abolished, but 
restricted to situations where the parties have implemented express and unequivocal provi-
sions to that effect into the policy. For instance, standard clauses frequently include terms 
with the effect of automatic termination of liability and/or contract.162 Nevertheless, the 
“default” warranty regime is significantly amended. 
4.3.3.3.1 Suspensive character of warranties 
Section 10 of the Insurance Act 2015163 provides that insurance warranties will no 
longer possess the specific remedy of “automatic discharge from liability”.164 Henceforth, a 
breach of warranty will have the effect of suspension of liability, which means that the 
insurer shall not cover two types of losses: 
(1) Occurring in the period between the breach and its rectification; 
(2) Attributable to something happening during that period, even if the loss occurred 
later. 
At the moment of rectification of a breach, the insurer’s liability will reattach. Ra-
tionale behind this rule is clear: if warranties are instruments of circumscribing the risk the 
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insurer agreed to indemnify, and this risk remains/becomes the same, the insurer cannot 
deny cover. In particular, Section 10 envisages following situations: 
(1) Subsection 10(5)(b) refers to breaches of “general warranties”, which are 
deemed remedied “if the insured ceases to be in breach”; 
(2) Subsection 10(5)(a) refers to breaches of “time-specific warranties”: undertak-
ings to do something or to fulfill specified conditions “by an ascertainable time”. Such 
breaches cannot “cease” if a deadline is already missed, but they can be “functionally” 
remedied165, which means that the risk insured must “become essentially the same as that 
originally contemplated by the parties”;  
(3) Subsection 10(4)(b) recognizes a third situation, when a breach of warranty is 
incapable of remedy (for example, when a statement under a warranty of past or present 
facts was inaccurate). In such case, the insurance cover either never commences, or re-
mains indefinitely suspended after a breach.166  
Notably, the practice of construing warranties as suspensive conditions is already fa-
miliar to English courts167: despite being helpful in individual cases, it has also led to un-
certainty about a status and an effect of particular contractual terms. The recent reform will 
not only make it easier for courts to reach fairer outcomes, but also to reduce a number of 
disputes concerning construction of policies. Furthermore, assureds will get a new stimulus 
to keep the marine adventure under control and rectify any discrepancies as prompt as pos-
sible. 
4.3.3.3.2 Terms designed to reduce a particular risk 
Section 11 of the Insurance Act 2015168 provides that, if a term tends to reduce a 
particular risk (loss of particular kind, or at particular time or place), a breach of that term 
should not release the insurer from liability for loss caused by other type of risk. To deter-
mine whether a policy provision fits this description, objective construction is required: 
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i.e., a normal effect of compliance with the term should be assessed, not what the parties 
subjectively intended it to be.169 
On the one hand, Section 11 embraces not only warranties, but also other types of 
terms: conditions precedent, definitions of risk and exclusion clauses. On the other hand, 
not all warranties relate to particular risks. They may: (1) address more general issues, as 
warranties concerned with the assured’s criminal record; (2) have no bearing on the risk at 
all, as premium warranties; or (3) define the whole risk insured under the policy, as warran-
ties of (non)commercial use of a vehicle.170 Hence, an objective of each warranty should be 
analyzed individually. 
It should be underlined that Section 11 does not introduce a causation test: for the 
insurer to rely on a breach of warranty, it is not required that it actually caused or contrib-
uted to the loss. It is sufficient that the warranty in principle relates to the risk, which re-
sulted in the loss. Consequently, the causation test prevents reliance on irrelevant breach-
es, while rule in Section 11 prevents reliance on irrelevant warranties, “where the type of 
loss which occurred is not one which compliance with the warranty or condition could have 
had any chance of preventing”.171 Undoubtedly, this approach is more favorable for the 
insurer than the causation test. 
According to Section 11(4), if the term in question is a warranty, Section 10 of the 
Insurance Act 2015 applies jointly. It means that in case of breach of a warranty that tends 
to reduce a particular risk, liability of the insurer will be suspended only in relation to loss-
es caused by that risk. It is a major improvement of the assured’s position in comparison 
with the situation under the MIA 1906. 
Nevertheless, a number of possible problems with a practical application of Section 
11 have already been noted172: 
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(1) It might be challenging to identify whether a warranty tends to reduce a particu-
lar risk. As mentioned above, some warranties have a more general implication; 
(2) Even when it is evident that a warranty is not of a general character, identifying 
its precise objective may be problematic. 
Therefore, Section 11 may become a source of extensive litigation concerning ob-
jectives of warranties. The Law Commission recognized this problem, stating that: “There 
is undoubtedly a degree of uncertainty relating to how the courts will interpret a “type of 
loss”, a “loss at a particular place” and “a loss at a particular time”[…]”.173 It is argued that 
“in determining what particular risk the warranty aims at, it will be inevitable to be drawn 
into an inquiry involving causation”; hence, “the proposed change to a certain extent intro-
duces causation by the back door”.174 This is especially striking, as the legislators intended 
to avoid the causation test. Moreover, the reform may lead to a costly review of standard 
clauses in order to contract out of the default statutory regime, or to specify aims of warran-
ties. 
 
Overall, the Insurance Act 2015 introduces a significant reform of the “classical” 
warranty regime, embodied in the MIA 1906. First, Section 10 abolishes the remedy of 
“automatic termination of liability”, which was a unique feature of warranties. From 2016, 
warranties will be equaled in effect with suspensive conditions. Hereof, the second 
amendment follows: the assured will normally have an opportunity to remedy a breach of 
warranty, so that the insurer’s liability will reattach. Furthermore, Section 11 has intro-
duced a new requirement for the insurer’s reliance on a breach, which could be character-
ized as the test of “objective materiality of a term to a particular risk”. Together, Sections 
10 and 11 of the Insurance Act 2015 provide the assured with significant protection from 
the insurer’s discretion. However, the Insurance Act 2015 still leaves a room for situations 
where the non-causative breach of warranty will allow the insurer to avoid the liability. 
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What is more, concerns were expressed about potential difficulties of interpretation of Sec-
tion 11 by courts. 
5 Conclusion 
5.1 Summary of the development process. Outlook on future perspectives 
In conclusion, it must be said that the development of the status of marine insurance 
warranties in the English law has been a lengthy process. Since the XVIII century, the war-
ranty regime was governed by such rigid rules, as: the “strict compliance” doctrine, the 
absolute character of warranties, disregard to materiality or causative character of a breach 
and irrelevance of a future rectification. The unique remedy of “automatic discharge from 
liability”, introduced by the MIA 1906 s 33(3), made the warranty regime even more bene-
ficial to insurers and detrimental to assureds. In practice, this disproportion resulted in the 
following problems: 
(1) The insurer could refuse to pay a claim for any breach of warranty, no matter how 
irrelevant (minor or non-causative) that breach was to the loss; 
(2) The insurer could refuse to pay a claim, though the breach of warranty has already 
been remedied; 
(3) In case of breach of warranty, the insurer generally was entitled for the whole 
amount of premium. 
Another reason for concern with the warranty regime under the MIA 1906 was that 
international practices were inclined towards more balanced solutions. The civil law ap-
proach to alteration of risk normally implies requirements of subjective materiality and 
causative character of an alteration, as well as some degree of culpability of the assured. 
What is more, even the common law countries have departed from the traditional warranty 
regime to various extents. 
Although there were attempts to mitigate the harshness of the warranty regime either 
through judicial interpretation of warranties, or through drafting of insurance contracts, 
these solutions were not sufficient. In order to keep in line with international standards, and 
to provide fairer outcomes for assureds, the English marine insurance law was in need for a 
legislative reform. As the result, the new Insurance Act 2015 was adopted. The main dif-
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ferences between the marine insurance warranty regime under the MIA 1906 and the Act 
2015 are that: 
(1) The remedy of “automatic termination of liability” is abolished. Under Section 10 
of the Act 2015, warranties are given a suspensive character: i.e., if a breach of war-
ranty is remedied, the insurer’s liability will reattach; 
(2) Section 11 of the Act 2015 introduces a new rule that if a term (i.a., warranty) tends 
to reduce a particular risk, the insurer is not entitled to rely on a breach of that term 
to deny liability for the loss caused by another risk. 
The recent reform has significantly mitigated the default warranty regime in the Eng-
lish marine insurance law. However, there is still one major difference from approaches 
adopted in the civil law countries, New Zealand, Canada and, to some extent, Australia and 
the USA: namely, this reform has not introduced a causation test. Although the rule in 
Section 11 of the Insurance Act 2015 may sometimes provide similar results, it still allows 
the insurer to rely on non-causative breaches. Moreover, the complexity of the rule in Sec-
tion 11 is likely to lead to numerous disputes about objectives of a particular warranty. 
Hence, a significant element of uncertainty is introduced into the English marine insurance 
law. 
Therefore, a question arises – was it really a justified step to avoid the causation test? 
Not only is it familiar to English courts; introduction of a causation element would have 
been a huge step towards internationalization of the English marine insurance market. It is 
possible that the upcoming development of the marine insurance warranty regime in the 
English law will be focused on a further recognition of a causation element, in order to 
avoid the limits set out by the Insurance Act 2105. Overall, a reaction of courts and the 
industry on the recent reform remains to be seen. 
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Insurance Act 2015 
2015 CHAPTER 4 
An Act to make new provision about insurance contracts; to amend the Third Parties 
(Rights against Insurers) Act 2010 in relation to the insured persons to whom that Act ap-
plies; and for connected purposes. [12th February 2015] 
 
(EXTRACTS) 
 
PART 3 
Warranties and other terms 
 
9 Warranties and representations 
(1)This section applies to representations made by the insured in connection with— 
(a) a proposed non-consumer insurance contract, or 
(b) a proposed variation to a non-consumer insurance contract. 
(2) Such a representation is not capable of being converted into a warranty by means of any 
provision of the non-consumer insurance contract (or of the terms of the variation), or of 
any other contract (and whether by declaring the representation to form the basis of the 
contract or otherwise). 
 
10 Breach of warranty 
(1) Any rule of law that breach of a warranty (express or implied) in a contract of insurance 
results in the discharge of the insurer's liability under the contract is abolished. 
(2) An insurer has no liability under a contract of insurance in respect of any loss occurring, 
or attributable to something happening, after a warranty (express or implied) in the contract 
has been breached but before the breach has been remedied. 
(3) But subsection (2) does not apply if— 
 (a) because of a change of circumstances, the warranty ceases to be applicable to the cir-
cumstances of the contract, 
(b) compliance with the warranty is rendered unlawful by any subsequent law, or 
(c) the insurer waives the breach of warranty. 
(4) Subsection (2) does not affect the liability of the insurer in respect of losses occurring, 
or attributable to something happening— 
(a) before the breach of warranty, or 
(b) if the breach can be remedied, after it has been remedied. 
(5) For the purposes of this section, a breach of warranty is to be taken as remedied— 
(a) in a case falling within subsection (6), if the risk to which the warranty relates later be-
comes essentially the same as that originally contemplated by the parties, 
(b) in any other case, if the insured ceases to be in breach of the warranty. 
(6) A case falls within this subsection if— 
(a) the warranty in question requires that by an ascertainable time something is to be done 
(or not done), or a condition is to be fulfilled, or something is (or is not) to be the case, and 
(b) that requirement is not complied with. 
(7) In the Marine Insurance Act 1906— 
(a) in section 33 (nature of warranty), in subsection (3), the second sentence is omitted, 
(b) section 34 (when breach of warranty excused) is omitted. 
 
11 Terms not relevant to the actual loss 
(1) This section applies to a term (express or implied) of a contract of insurance, other than 
a term defining the risk as a whole, if compliance with it would tend to reduce the risk of 
one or more of the following— 
(a) loss of a particular kind, 
(b) loss at a particular location, 
(c) loss at a particular time. 
(2) If a loss occurs, and the term has not been complied with, the insurer may not rely on 
the non-compliance to exclude, limit or discharge its liability under the contract for the loss 
if the insured satisfies subsection (3). 
 (3) The insured satisfies this subsection if it shows that the non-compliance with the term 
could not have increased the risk of the loss which actually occurred in the circumstances 
in which it occurred. 
(4) This section may apply in addition to section 10. 
